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Strategy for the European 
 External Action Service
The current wrangling over the design and respon-
sibilities of  the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) should not be surprising. When, in June 2003, 
the EU Convention presented the suggestion for a 
European constitutional treaty with a provision for a 
soon-to-be office of  a “European Foreign Minister,” 
as it was then called, it was already clear that the at-
tendees—among them actors from European govern-
ments, parliaments and Brussels institutions—would 
not reach a consensus on a powerful foreign policy 
representative of  the EU.
It is said that the then-foreign minister of  Germany, 
Joschka Fischer, lost his interest in the job when the 
so-called “double hat” was decided on: the new Euro-
pean foreign minister would belong to the European 
Commission, as its Foreign Commissioner and vice 
president, as well as to the Council of  Foreign Min-
isters. In the latter, the European foreign minister, or 
the “High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy,” as the office is now called, would take the 
chair.
The Foreign Ministries Lie in Wait
Imagine serving two institutions who, from their very 
nature, could hardly be more different. On the one 
hand, the supranational European Commission in 
which Lady Ashton’s European “socialization” took 
place. At the very least she occupied—if  only brief-
ly—the office of  foreign trade commissioner. In the 
area of  foreign trade policy, the EU Commission has 
contractually confirmed competencies that make it a 
strong player in international trade questions. With 
these competencies, it can gain the respect of  even 
the People’s Republic of  China—a lesson that Lady 
Ashton personally learned. On the other hand, the 
foreign representative must also chair the Council of  
Foreign Ministers of  the European Union. Here the 
foreign ministries of  the member states attempt to 
keep her on a short leash. The foreign ministries find 
themselves somewhere between numb shock and lying 
in wait. The Lisbon Treaty took away their presence in 
the European Council—the “conference” of  heads of  
state and government. Under its new President, Her-
man Van Rompuy, the European Council is becom-
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ing the shooting star of  the Lisbon Treaty, and in the 
process has hung the foreign ministries out to dry. 
They are no longer at the table, while the European 
Council is becoming an ever-more important organ of  
government.
These new developments have provoked long faces at 
the German foreign office. The old struggle between 
the foreign office and the federal chancellery over 
control over European policy was elegantly resolved in 
favor of  the Chancellor and her advisors—by the new 
provisions of  the Lisbon Treaty. In the foreign min-
istries there is next to no willingness to accept losing 
more power. The larger member states, at least, show 
reluctance with the political initiatives for the structur-
ing of  the EEAS, a third of  which will be comprised 
of  national diplomats, but which for their own sake 
should not become too powerful. Because it would 
be, on the other hand, unbecoming to torpedo the 
EEAS, the national foreign services find it advisable 
not to openly undermine the EEAS, nor to give it any 
special honors—at least in these early days. So, for the 
moment, the debate over the EEAS lacks ambition. In 
the German government, the debate is merely about 
the appropriate representation of  Germany in the 
new diplomatic service of  the European Union. And 
people are chomping at the question of  language: Ger-
man should also be an official language of  the EEAS.
Observers marvel that the member states have in fact 
successfully prevented any strategic debate on the 
EEAS. Instead, talk in Brussels and the European 
capitals is all about placing bureaucratic limitations on 
the power of  Lady Ashton’s staff.
A Schuman for Foreign Policy
At the same time, the international situation for Eu-
rope could hardly be more dramatic. In Copenhagen 
last December, China showed the European Union 
precisely how new power politics à la Beijing function. 
For months the members of  the eurozone have been 
trying desperately to convey to the world that their 
currency is robust. What actually has to happen so that 
the nations of  Europe can separate what’s being said 
from the reality that they will not be able to assert their 
interests alone, and so that the new foreign posts can 
play a central role conveying Europe’s interests to the 
world? In the future, the EU embassies could become 
images of  the European Union in miniature, rather 
than simply representing the politics of  the EU Com-
mission as they have done up to now. Here lies the 
considerable potential for the Union’s public diplo-
macy. During these crisis-shaken days, hardly anyone 
remembers the visionary Schuman Declaration of  May 
9, 1950, which recently celebrated its 60th birthday. 
This declaration laid the foundation for the commu-
nitarization of  coal and steel production, essential for 
war-making—and the guarantee for peace between the 
EU members until today. What the European Union 
needs now is a similarly visionary debate about the 
future of  its foreign policy.
Be Where Ones Interests Are:  
The Middle East as Proving Ground
The neighboring Middle East serves as an example. 
The Union attributes strategic priority to solving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. It was therefore a good decision 
on the part of  the new High Representative to travel 
to the Middle East on one of  her first longer trips 
abroad, in March 2010. She timed the trip to coin-
cide with one of  the more important meetings of  the 
Middle East Quartet in Moscow. Her decision to visit 
Gaza on the trip sent a political signal. This is a step in 
the right direction.
The parameters in this region have shifted significant-
ly in recent years: there is a high probability that Iran 
is building a nuclear bomb, and the two-state solution 
between Israel and the Palestinians is becoming ever 
less likely, due to Israel’s settlement policy and the 
operations of  the radical Hamas in Gaza. Refugees 
are increasingly seeking to flee to Europe via North 
Africa, and in a rare merger, six Gulf  states formed 
the Gulf  Cooperation Council—with which the Eu-
ropean Union has long attempted to sign a free trade 
agreement, so far unsuccessfully. It was important for 
Lady Ashton to show a presence in this region—and 
quickly.
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A strategic debate on the Middle East is also neces-
sary, and must be connected with the current structur-
ing of  the EEAS: how can the structures of  the new 
EEAS be designed in order to best serve the interests 
of  Europeans in the Middle East? How many employ-
ees should work at which posts, with which substan-
tive priorities, which instruments, and what financial 
means? What role will the special envoys have in 
relation to all this? Beyond bureaucratic questions of  
the division of  rights, responsibilities, resources, and 
competencies between the Commission and the Coun-
cil of  the EU in the new EEAS, it must be possible to 
conduct this essential substantive debate as well.
Show Presence and Determination in Respect  
To Third-Party States
In Berlin, too little thought is being put into the ef-
fects of  this bloodless debate on the EEAS on the 
partner nations of  the European Union. It is not in 
Germany’s interest to leave the impression on the 
United States, for example, that we have worked for 
almost a decade towards the new provisions of  the 
Lisbon Treaty, that we have promised more coherence 
and efficiency, above all in foreign policy, and that we 
now falter when faced with implementation. Europe’s 
governments are damaging themselves with their de-
fensive posturing. But they have so far not been called 
to account for their actions, since it benefits them to 
continue the nonexistent debate over the EEAS to the 
point of  bureaucratic boredom and exhaustion. This 
has led to the state of  affairs that, these days, visitors 
to Washington are not once asked about current devel-
opments in the EEAS.
It is now time to have a real debate about the future 
of  European foreign policy and the role of  its foreign 
service: a debate that centers not on bureaucratic, but 
rather on substantive criteria. First, an inventory and 
evaluation of  the present and previous delegations of  
the European Commission in third-party states—that 
will now be transformed into EU embassies—must 
take place. At the same time, it must be clarified 
whether EU diplomats and staff  actually serve in ap-
propriate numbers in those places where European 
interests lie. Second, it must be ensured that the work 
of  the EEAS, which, according to the outline sketched 
here, should have extensive responsibilities, will be 
subjected to parliamentary control. Third, non-govern-
mental organizations now have the chance to engage 
more than ever before with the subject of  the EEAS. 
The formation of  the EEAS signifies not only the de-
velopment of  a new institution, but also a decision on 
the content and focus of  the future foreign policy of  
the Union that should not simply be left to the govern-
ments of  the EU member states and the institutions in 
Brussels.
Indeed, the original time frame, to reach a decision 
on the EEAS before the elections in Great Britain, 
was frail. But now there is no time to lose. The EEAS 
must become deployable as quickly as possible so that 
the High Representative, rather than fighting a tough, 
multi-front turf  war, can fulfill her actual office: to 
lead the foreign policy of  the European Union.
The considerations sketched out here may be criticized 
as wishful thinking by many. But that does not change 
their necessity. This chance for European foreign 
policy to have a fresh institutional start is a rare one.
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